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F rank Knight (1921) proposed that we should not think of entrepreneurship as simply investment under risk, where decisions are made with respect to an objectively known distribution of returns. He argued that entrepreneurship 
in such a world would not require any particular skill and it would be inconceivable 
that entrepreneurs could earn rents simply for bearing objective risk as a market 
should eliminate those rents. Knight therefore put forward the idea that the prereq-
uisites for entrepreneurial activity are a combination of highly uncertain returns 
that do not have an objectively known distribution, as well as the entrepreneur’s 
skill in perceiving opportunity more clearly than others.
Knight’s (1921) work focused attention on the specific individuals pursuing 
entrepreneurship and what made them distinct. Subsequent research in this vein 
has aimed to understand the individual traits, motivations, and preferences that 
make some individuals more likely to pursue entrepreneurship than others. Ironi-
cally, while Knight was interested in justifying why entrepreneurs should earn 
supernormal returns, much of this subsequent research has found the opposite to 
be true. That is, there is a growing body of evidence that many entrepreneurs seem 
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to enter and persist in entrepreneurship despite earning low risk-adjusted returns. 
This finding has led, in turn, to attempts to provide explanations—using both 
standard economic theory and behavioral economics—for why certain individuals 
may be attracted to such an apparently unprofitable activity.
In this article, we critically evaluate what the existing research shows regarding 
the individual determinants of entrepreneurship. We begin by documenting a set 
of facts that seem to pose a challenge for interpretations of entrepreneurship based 
on the standard expected utility framework. The expected returns to entrepreneur-
ship tend to be low on average but exhibit a high variance due to the fact that most 
startups fail completely and only a few are extremely successful. Hall and Woodward 
(2010) calculate that, for normal degrees of risk aversion, the very low probability 
of success and high probability of zero exit value make the expected utility of entre-
preneurial ventures negative—meaning that people should prefer not to engage 
in entrepreneurship. Yet each year, over 500,000  individuals in the United States 
start firms with at least one employee, and approximately 40 percent of American 
workers experience at least one period of self-employment during their careers 
(Parker 2009). Entrepreneurs also seem to persist in running businesses for long 
periods of time despite either low absolute returns (Hamilton 2000; Åstebro 2003) 
or returns that appear low after controlling for the highly concentrated illiquid 
stakes they hold in businesses compared to public equity markets (Moskowitz and 
Vissing-Jørgensen 2002).
The fact that individuals enter and persist in entrepreneurship despite low 
risk-adjusted returns suggests that standard theories of risk and return provide 
an incomplete basis for entrepreneurship and may need to be complemented 
with richer foundations. That is, while it certainly seems plausible that entrepre-
neurs have different preferences about risk in a broad sense, there is also the 
possibility that the standard expected utility model based on objectively known 
distributions of risk may not capture such differences well. Indeed, widely held 
popular interpretations of entrepreneurial entry often appeal to behavioral expla-
nations, such as those involving high degrees of risk loving among entrepreneurs 
who “don’t need to be rewarded for risk, because they actually get utility out of 
risk itself” (Harrington 2010); overconfidence and “endemic optimism” in the 
startup world (Surowiecki 2014); or entrepreneurs who forgo pecuniary rewards 
because of the genuine pleasure they obtain from creating and controlling a busi-
ness (Wasserman 2008).
Drawing on research in behavioral economics, in the sections that follow, we 
review three sets of possible interpretations for understanding the empirical facts 
related to the entry into, and persistence in, entrepreneurship. Differences in risk 
aversion provide a plausible and intuitive interpretation of entrepreneurial activity. 
In addition, a growing literature has begun to highlight the potential importance 
of overconfidence in driving entrepreneurial outcomes. Such a mechanism may 
appear at face value to work like a lower level of risk aversion, but there are clear 
conceptual differences—in particular, overconfidence likely arises from behav-
ioral biases and misperceptions of probability distributions. Finally, nonpecuniary, 
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taste-based factors may be important in motivating both the decisions to enter into 
and to persist in entrepreneurship.
While all these candidate explanations have merit and can account for some 
aspects of the facts above, there is little evidence of a “smoking gun” that can 
completely account for all the puzzling patterns we observe. In fact, our reading of 
the literature suggests that even papers that find evidence consistent with one inter-
pretation are often unable to rule out other mechanisms that are also consistent 
with their results. Hence, while strong statements on what drives entrepreneurs are 
widespread in the popular literature, the evidence thus far fails to provide compel-
ling evidence for such a unifying interpretation. Indeed, it is unclear whether a 
single interpretation that can account for the entire puzzle of entrepreneurial 
behavior even exists.
A deeper understanding of the roots of entrepreneurship is not only important 
from a theoretical and academic standpoint, but is also critical for policies addressing 
entrepreneurship, given the central role that entrepreneurs play in driving produc-
tivity growth. In particular, distinguishing the extent to which these patterns are 
driven by behavioral biases versus preferences is important when thinking about 
policies that might promote entrepreneurship. Therefore, after reviewing the 
evidence regarding interpretations for the empirical puzzle, we outline promising 
avenues for further research.
The Entrepreneur’s Risk and Return: An Empirical Puzzle
We begin with a set of empirical patterns related to entrepreneurship that create 
a puzzle when seen through the lens of standard economic models of expected 
utility and risk.
First, the empirical evidence on returns to entrepreneurship suggests that it 
tends to be an activity with low median returns but with very high variance—that 
is, a few entrepreneurs are extremely successful, but the vast majority of entrepre-
neurs either fail or face meager returns. Figure 1 documents these patterns, both for 
the broader economy and for the subset of new ventures that are backed by venture 
capital. Figure 1A is based on data from the Business Information Tracking Series at 
the US Census Bureau, as documented by Shane (2009). For the 510,654 businesses 
founded in 1996, Shane (2009) calculates the share of businesses that had either failed 
or achieved a certain level of annual sales six years later in 2002. Over 50 percent of 
the businesses had failed within the six years, less than 10 percent achieved more than 
$1 million in sales, and less than 1 percent had achieved more than $10 million in 
sales. However, 175 firms or 0.03 percent achieved more than $100 million in sales, 
making them extremely valuable (and rare) business endeavors. These failure rates 
are broadly consistent with Kerr and Nanda (2010), who document that 50 percent 
of all startups founded in the United States between 1976 and 2001 exited within the 
first four years following entry and 70 percent failed by their tenth year, suggesting 
there was nothing particularly different about startups founded in 1996.
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Figure  1B is based on data from Sand Hill Econometrics, as reported by 
Hall and Woodward (2010). They analyze the outcomes at exit for the subset of 
startups founded between 1987 and 2008 in the United States that were financed 
by venture capital. Venture-capital-backed startups account for under 1  percent 
of the startups founded each year and typically focus on higher-growth ventures 
commercializing new technologies or products. The typical contract between the 
venture capital investor and the entrepreneur involves the entrepreneur taking a 
below-market salary and a share of the equity. Hall and Woodward find that even 
for these high-growth ventures, the equity value is zero in almost three-quarters of 
the startups in their sample. However, a few “billion dollar exits” raise the average 
value of the entrepreneurs’ equity to $5.8 million. Hall and Woodward calculate 
that, for normal degrees of risk aversion, the very low probability of success and 
high probability of zero exit value combined with the below market salary makes 
the expected utility of entrepreneurial ventures presumptively negative—meaning 
that people should prefer not to engage in entrepreneurship. Because the same 
Figure 1 
The Pattern of Failure and Success in Entrepreneurship
Source: Figure  1A is based on data from the Business Information Tracking Series at the US Census 
Bureau, as documented by Shane (2009).
Note: Figure 1A shows for the 510,654 US businesses founded in 1996, the share that had either failed or 
achieved a certain level of sales by 2002.
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skewed distributions of returns are present for all startups in the United States, and 
these startups are likely to yield much lower returns than the venture-capital-backed 
startups, this suggests that Hall and Woodward’s (2010) conclusion that people with 
a normal degree of risk aversion should not become entrepreneurs applies not only 
to venture-capital-backed entrepreneurial activity, but to entrepreneurial activity 
more generally.
The expected utility framework does, of course, allow for heterogeneous risk 
preferences. However, these patterns, when combined with the high frequency of 
participation in entrepreneurship, suggest that either a sizeable proportion of the 
population is risk-loving (making it hard to reconcile with other facts about deci-
sion making in the general population), or the expected utility framework does 
not provide a complete characterization of how individuals decide whether to 
pursue entrepreneurship.
A second dimension of the entrepreneurial puzzle is that not only do many 
individuals enter despite such low odds of success, but entrepreneurs also seem to 
persist in running businesses for long periods of time despite either low absolute 
Source: Figure 1B is based on data from Sand Hill Econometrics, as reported by Hall and Woodward (2010).
Note: Figure 1B analyzes outcomes at exit for the subset of startups in the US founded between 1987 and 
2008 that were financed by venture capital.
Figure 1 (continued)
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returns (Hamilton 2000) or returns that appear low after controlling for the highly 
concentrated illiquid stakes they hold in businesses compared to public equity 
markets. For example, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) find that entre-
preneurial households persistently hold large undiversified stakes in their (mostly 
private) firms, whose returns are no greater than that of public equity. They find 
that these “private equity’” investments are at least as volatile and far less liquid than 
public equity markets, but the returns to these highly undiversified entrepreneurial 
private equity portfolios are no higher than the returns to public equity. They 
conclude that the private equity should require a premium of at least 10 percent per 
year to justify such investment. Furthermore, Åstebro, Jeffrey, and Adomdza (2007) 
found, using a sample of 820 Canadian inventor entrepreneurs who had sought and 
paid for assistance from a center originating from the University of Waterloo, that 
almost one-third continued to spend money and half continued to spend time on 
projects even after the diagnostic advice from the center advised them to cease; and 
follow-up data showed little to no value from their further efforts.
Corroborating evidence of this puzzle is provided in Figure 2, which compares 
the total earnings of wage employees to those of self-employed individuals, using 
comprehensive microdata from Denmark. The analysis is based on a 10-percent 
random sample of all employees and entrepreneurs in 1995, but is then condi-
tioned on individuals whose tenure at their job is at least ten years—in order to 
compare individuals who would be presumed to have a good match to their job. 
Similar to Figure 1, Figure 2 documents very high dispersion of earnings among 
the self-employed, including a large number of individuals whose earnings are 
lower than that of the typical wage employee. Figure 2 is based on individuals who 
have been in their job for at least ten years, meaning that this pattern cannot be 
accounted for purely by lack of time for some entrepreneurs to learn they have low 
ability and exit (as in Jovanovic 1982). It’s true that the comparison in Figure 2 does 
not control for observable covariates across these groups, and it does not account 
for sorting based on comparative advantage: thus, it is possible that some of the 
self-employed who earn less than wage employees are earning the most that they 
could in either sector. However, Hamilton (2000) finds that, in his sample based on 
US data, the patterns hold true even when accounting for covariates and for sorting 
based on sector-specific abilities. The pattern illustrated in Figure 2 seems to suggest 
the presence of compensating differentials, where some entrepreneurs seem willing 
to persistently take lower earnings in return for the nonpecuniary benefits associ-
ated with self-employment.
Understanding Entrepreneurial Decision Making
Risk Preferences
In the standard expected utility framework, the expected returns to entre-
preneurship are determined by the probability distribution over various possible 
outcomes and the utility obtained from the monetary returns in each of these 
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outcomes. An individual will enter entrepreneurship if this utility assessment is pref-
erable to some alternative occupation, and choose employment otherwise.
Risk preferences are defined by the utility function over wealth in the standard 
expected utility framework. Most people have utility functions that imply risk aver-
sion, and such people are more willing to take work with regular and less-variable 
pay. However, a smaller proportion of people—who exhibit less curvature in their 
utility functions over wealth, and thus less risk aversion—are more likely to be 
attracted to the possibility of large gains from highly risky ventures such as entrepre-
neurial activity. Thus, holding constant other factors such as entrepreneurial ability 
and financing constraints, the individual’s preferences over risk can play a critical 
role in determining the entry decision.
Early models of entrepreneurship attempted to account for entrepreneurial 
entry within the standard expected-utility framework of economic decision making 
under risk. For instance, Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) proposed a theory of entre-
preneurship based on differences in risk attitudes, in which optimal risk-sharing 
between individuals implies that those who are more risk-tolerant become entrepre-
neurs, while those who are more risk-averse become employees.
Figure 2 
Comparison of Wage versus Self-Employment Earnings (Denmark)
Source: Authors using data from the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA). The database 
is maintained by the Danish government and consists of an annual panel of all individuals, and firms 
in Denmark.
Notes: Figure 2 compares the total earnings of wage employees to those of self-employed individuals, 
using comprehensive microdata from Denmark. The distributions are truncated at 1 million Danish 
kroner. See text for details.
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A number of empirical studies have attempted to document a difference in risk 
preferences between entrepreneurs and similar workers who do not start businesses, 
but the results have been mixed. One approach involves measuring risk taking in 
other domains of life and using these observations as a proxy for an individual’s risk 
tolerance. Hvide and Panos (2014) look at detailed data on Norwegians who started 
firms from 2000–2007. They rely on extensive Norwegian government data from tax 
records that include investment behavior and wealth, as well as on detailed records 
of all new incorporations in the relevant time period. They show that individuals 
who participate in the stock market, who invest a higher fraction of their wealth 
into the stock market, or who have more volatile stock portfolios—presumably, 
those who possess greater risk tolerance—are more likely to become entrepreneurs. 
Moreover, Hvide and Panos also find that more risk-tolerant entrepreneurs yield 
lower-performing firms, measured by number of employees, sales, and profitability. 
This is consistent with the theoretical prediction that individuals with higher toler-
ance for risk are willing to enter entrepreneurship in expectation of lower returns, 
keeping the risk constant.
Another approach to documenting a connection between risk preferences and 
entrepreneurial entry is to attempt to measure individuals’ risk preferences directly. 
Parker (2009) provides a review of studies comparing such measures between entre-
preneur and non-entrepreneur samples. However, no clear picture arises, with some 
studies pointing toward differences in risk attitudes between the two samples, while 
others find no such relationship between risk attitudes and entrepreneurship. Many 
of these studies suffer from small samples and non-incentivized methods of eliciting 
risk preferences. There also exists the possibility that the samples, often the product 
of convenience and access, are nonrepresentative of the broader populations of 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.
Other studies use longitudinal data to compare risk attitudes earlier in life 
with later career paths. Ahn (2010) looks at responses to hypothetical questions 
about risk that were included in 1993 and in 2002 in the 1979 National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth and finds that those who indicate less risk aversion are 
more likely to become entrepreneurs in the subsequent two years. Cramer, Hartog, 
Jonker, and Van Praag (2002) use the “Brabant survey” that involved 5,800 Dutch 
schoolchildren who were originally interviewed and tested in 1952 at the age of 12. 
In a re-interview in 1993, 1,800 of the original participants answered a hypothetical 
risk question, and those who had been self-employed at some point in time in the 
observation period indicated lower degrees of risk aversion. While these studies add 
value because of their longitudinal nature, they still suffer from the hypothetical 
nature of the risk elicitation method, and in some instances, the risk measures taken 
later in life may not match risk preferences at the earlier stage of life.
Further promise for identifying risk attitudes as a driver of entrepreneurial 
entry comes from experimental economics, which offers tools for incentivized 
elicitation of individuals’ risk preferences. Individuals are confronted with choices 
between lotteries and certain payments, with real financial consequences, and their 
profile of choices provides a direct measure of their risk preferences (Holt and 
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Laury 2002). If risk preferences constitute a stable characteristic of an individual, 
and these preferences drive entrepreneurship, the application of such methods 
to eliciting risk preferences for samples of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs 
could provide evidence that these groups differ in their risk preferences. One 
study attempting to create such a connection was conducted by Holm, Opper, and 
Nee (2013). They randomly sampled 700 entrepreneurs heading firms with at least 
ten employees from local firm registers and 200 control subjects from the Yangzi 
delta region of China. Both were offered the same incentivized choice menu 
between various risky and safe outcomes. However, the answers show no difference 
in preferences towards risk between the entrepreneurs and the control group. 
When choice menus were offered that involved ambiguity rather than objective 
risk, the result was the same—again, no difference was found between entrepre-
neurs and the control group.
In short, the evidence that entrepreneurial entry can be explained by a group 
of people with very different general risk attitudes than the general population is 
quite mixed and inconclusive. Some studies suggest that those who start firms are 
more risk seeking, but others find no association. Indeed, perhaps the most compel-
ling tests from the viewpoint of a critical economist—those in which incentivized 
elicitation of risk preferences is employed—do not find strong evidence of such 
entrepreneur versus non-entrepreneur heterogeneity.
Hence, while an interpretation of entrepreneurship as reflecting lower degrees 
of risk aversion than those in the population remains a potential parsimonious 
interpretation for some aspects of the puzzle, more evidence is needed before one 
can conclude that lower risk aversion is, indeed, a primary driver. The evidence 
on whether entrepreneurs are less risk-averse and whether this preference drives 
entrepreneurial entry decisions remains, at best, suggestive. Moreover, even if entre-
preneurs are less risk-averse than the general population, this finding would not 
directly imply that entrepreneurs are willing to take the relatively high degrees of 
risk associated with entrepreneurial entry.
Overconfidence
An alternative explanation that is often proposed to explain entry into entre-
preneurship is overconfidence. This explanation implies that individuals enter into 
entrepreneurship because they subjectively perceive the return distribution too 
favorably when evaluating their own entrepreneurial project. For example, Cooper, 
Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) report that 33 percent of the 3,000 entrepreneurs 
they surveyed put their odds of success at 10 out of 10, despite putting much lower 
odds of success for other businesses that were similar to their own. More recently, 
Shane (2009) reports findings from a Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey that 
finds US entrepreneurs report believing it more than five times as likely that they 
will have at least $10 million in sales than is empirically the case. It has therefore 
been suggested that those seeking to become entrepreneurs must be imbued with 
what Adam Smith (1776 [1904], p. 110; see also de Meza and Southey 1996, p. 375) 
termed “the contempt of risk and the presumptuous hope of success.”
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Overconfidence may even account for differential patterns of behavior among 
those who become entrepreneurs. Landier and Thesmar (2009) used survey data 
collected by Statistics France on a nationally representative sample of French entre-
preneurs to construct a measure comparing expectations with future outcomes, 
which were measured using linked panel data. Those whose expectations exceeded 
future outcomes were more likely to use short-term debt finance rather than the 
less-risky option of long-term debt finance.
People often use the general term “overconfidence” to interpret results like 
those above. However, multiple measures and definitions across empirical studies 
have made it hard to pin down the precise bias that may be behind entrepreneur-
ship. Moore and Healy (2008) provide a useful distinction between three  forms 
of the general phenomenon of overconfidence. The first concept is overestimation 
of one’s ability or performance. The second concept is overplacement: individuals 
assess their skill relative to others as too high. Finally, overprecision is the excessive 
certainty regarding the accuracy of one’s beliefs. In addition, one needs to distin-
guish overconfidence from optimism (Weinstein 1980), which reflects a general 
view that “good things will happen.” Optimism is considered to be a more stable 
individual trait, not specific to a particular project; to be optimistic is to have gener-
ally positively biased expectations. Economists more precisely define an optimist as 
a person who generally “revises up the probability of favorable events and revises 
down the probability of unfavorable events” (Hey 1984).
Overestimation, overplacement, and optimism are often observationally 
equivalent—for example, the above survey evidence from 3,000 entrepreneurs by 
Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) cannot distinguish between them. However, 
the underlying psychology is quite different, and the decision environment deter-
mines which factors can actually be at work. For example, overplacement requires 
direct comparisons to a reference group, a feature mainly present in established 
and contested markets; overestimation applies more broadly to a larger set of situa-
tions in which individuals judge their own ability; and optimism indicates a general 
belief propensity that applies even to situations over which a decision maker has 
no control. Consequently, the implications of these mechanisms for understanding 
entrepreneurship and for policy may not be equivalent. Therefore, an under-
standing of the precise form of overconfidence that might account for the puzzle of 
excessive entrepreneurial entry requires an ability to distinguish which precise bias 
drives entrepreneurship, and under what circumstances.
Optimism and overestimation. Researchers have tried to establish a relation-
ship between general optimism and entrepreneurship by measuring optimism 
in domains of life unrelated to an individual’s entrepreneurial skills. Puri and 
Robinson (2007) constructed such a measure based on data from the Survey of 
Consumer Finance: specifically, they compared people’s own estimates of their life 
expectancy to what is implied by actuarial tables. They found that more-optimistic 
people were more likely to be entrepreneurs. They also found that extreme opti-
mists were more likely to make high-risk and even imprudent financial choices. 
Relatedly, Bengtsson and Ekeblom (2014) use survey data on Swedes’ beliefs about 
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future nationwide economic conditions using responses from 153 monthly surveys 
conducted between January 1996 and October 2009, again measuring optimism by 
how expressed beliefs relate to later outcomes. They find that entrepreneurs hold 
more optimistic beliefs about the general economy, but also that they have lower 
forecast errors than non-entrepreneurs.
Dawson, de Meza, Henley, and Arabsheibani (2014) used the British Household 
Panel Study covering 1991–2008 to examine how optimistic forecasts—comparing 
earnings expectations with future realized outcomes as an employee—predicted 
performance in subsequent entrepreneurship spells. Since the authors had 
multiple years of data for individuals as wage earners (on average 5.1 years) they 
could construct individual fixed-effects estimates of prior optimism net of any envi-
ronmental influences. The authors also carefully excluded effects from individual 
ability, which could otherwise co-determine both prior wage earnings—and thus the 
authors’ measure of optimism—and future earnings as an entrepreneur. Dawson 
et  al. found that optimists, on average, earned less than pessimists in entrepre-
neurship, and that the earnings difference was largest at the top of the earnings 
distribution and not significant at the bottom.
While optimism and overestimation are often closely related, some work 
attempts to explicitly differentiate between the two as drivers of entrepreneurial 
entry. Åstebro, Jeffrey, and Adomdza (2007) compared the behavior of 820 Canadian 
inventor-entrepreneurs, measuring both overestimation and optimism, with that 
of a comparable random sample of 300 Canadian citizens. The authors followed a 
well-established method for measuring overestimation by comparing individuals’ predic-
tions of their performance to their actual performances on a general knowledge test 
(Lichtenstein, Fischoff, and Phillips 1982). In addition, the authors measured opti-
mism as reflecting a person’s general view that good things will happen (Weinstein 
1980). The survey data showed that inventors tended toward both more overestima-
tion and optimism than the comparison group. However, the overestimation measure 
was not significantly related to increased expenditures of time and money, while 
entrepreneurs with greater levels of optimism were more likely to keep pursuing an 
idea even with little chance of success, and thus to incur higher losses.
The controlled decision environments provided by incentivized experiments 
make them useful to further assess the relevance of overestimation and optimism. 
Studying the behavior of students and executives with entrepreneurial experience 
in laboratory experiments, Åstebro, Mata, and Santos-Pinto (2014) employed an 
experimental design in which success probabilities are exogenously determined 
and known by subjects, in order to rule out overestimation of own skill as a driver of 
behavior. Their findings suggest that general optimism, rather than convex utility, 
drives what appears to be a preference for the kinds of skewed lotteries that charac-
terize entrepreneurship.
Overplacement. Overplacement is different from overestimation and optimism 
in that it refers to a direct comparison of own skill to competitors. Consequently, 
overplacement may be a particularly valid explanation for entrepreneurial entry 
into contested markets, where one could have a biased belief in the likelihood of 
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coming out ahead of the competition. Early evidence suggesting such a relationship 
between overplacement and market entry came from an experiment by Camerer 
and Lovallo (1999). In their experiment, students who were undergraduates or 
MBAs at either the University of Chicago or the University of Pennsylvania could 
earn money by entering a “market” where payoffs depend on their rank among all 
entrants. In the baseline condition, ranks were assigned randomly, but in a skill 
condition, subjects were told they would be ranked according to their relative 
performance in a trivia quiz. Camerer and Lovallo found that significantly more 
subjects entered the market in the skill condition. This excessive entry took place 
despite the fact that subjects correctly predicted that there would be excessive entry 
in the skill condition (but not in the baseline condition). The authors concluded 
that although subjects expect excessive entry, they are willing to enter the market 
because they hold a biased belief that they are among the most skilled, which makes 
entry appear profitable in expectation.
The study by Holm, Opper, and Nee (2013) of Chinese entrepreneurs and 
control subjects discussed in the previous section also provides evidence suggesting 
a possible relationship between overplacement and entrepreneurial market entry. 
Their entrepreneur and control subjects participated in a market entry task similar 
to the one used by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). Holm et al. find that the entre-
preneurs were more willing to enter competitive environments, in which success 
depended on own skill, than the control group. However, the entrepreneurs did 
not, on average, overplace themselves in expected performance compared to the 
control group. Hence, the connection between overplacement and entrepreneur-
ship in this study is imperfect and raises the possibility that the entrepreneurs 
possess a preference for competition per se, rather than biased beliefs about their 
relative abilities.
Overprecision. While overplacement, overestimation, and optimism all lead to 
positively biased perceptions of expected returns and hence should foster entrepre-
neurial entry, the effects of overprecision are less clear. Herz, Schunk, and Zehnder 
(2014) look at the effect of overprecision on the trade-off between exploration and 
exploitation, one of the key features of the innovative process that also underlies 
entrepreneurial activity (Kerr, Nanda, and Rhodes-Kropf, in this symposium). They 
argue that overprecision, the tendency to underestimate variance of own informa-
tion, can reduce the perceived option value of exploration and therefore actually 
reduce incentives to engage in entrepreneurship. Herz, Schunk, and Zehnder 
experimentally tested these predictions with students and business managers. 
Subjects participated in an incentivized individual decision-making task in which 
they had to manage a virtual ice cream stand and repeatedly make decisions over 
the offered product mix.1 Subjects faced an overall choice about tweaking a pre-
existing strategy or trying brand-new strategies to maximize profits. Overprecision 
was then measured in an independent task using an established method in which 
1 The experiment is adopted from Ederer and Manso (2013), who use a similar task to study the effect of 
different incentive schemes on the exploration–exploitation trade-off.
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individuals state 90 percent confidence intervals for ten  trivia questions—that is, 
such that they are 90 percent certain that the correct answer is contained in the 
interval (Lichtenstein et al. 1982). Subjects who are overconfident in precision typi-
cally provide overly narrow ranges, so that actual values fall outside the range more 
than 10 percent of the time. Herz, Schunk, and Zehnder find that overprecision is 
indeed negatively related to experimentation and realized profits, suggesting the 
possibility that some forms of overconfidence may lead to a bias away from the type 
of exploration that is central to entrepreneurship.
Taken together, some evidence suggests overconfidence in the form of opti-
mism, overestimation, and overplacement could help explain entrepreneurial 
entry. Perhaps the strongest support comes from correlational evidence between 
broad measures of optimism and entrepreneurship. However, even if one believes 
these correlations reflect a causal relationship, the precise nature of overconfidence 
driving the relationship is not well understood. Since different forms of overcon-
fidence may differentially impact entrepreneurial decision making, more work is 
required to better understand the precise type of overconfidence that affects entre-
preneurship and how it does so.
Moreover, many open questions remain. For starters, the studies above measure 
overconfidence using measures unrelated to the domain of entrepreneurship; 
that is, measures of overconfidence and optimism mostly stem from independent 
measurements, assuming that these are personality traits that apply generally. This 
assumption may have some merit, but it would be valuable to have more detailed 
measures of different forms of overconfidence and optimism directly relating to 
entrepreneurial activity. For example, in contexts other than entrepreneurial entry, 
some headway has been made in this direction by Malmendier and Tate (2005a; 
2005b) by measuring chief executive officers’ overconfidence as continuing to hold 
stock options in their own firms after the options are fully vested.
Finally, several researchers note that behavior that appears to result from 
overconfidence may often also have rational, Bayesian interpretations (Benoît and 
Dubra 2011; Manso 2013; Van den Steen 2004). For example, assessing yourself to 
be above average is only a bias for those below the average, which may be a small 
proportion of the population. In addition, if your knowledge about the perfor-
mance of your comparison group is low, it may make sense to place yourself above it. 
Nonpecuniary Benefits
The above interpretations primarily address the observation of too much entry 
by entrepreneurs. As we note earlier, there is also mounting evidence of persis-
tence in entrepreneurship despite the low average returns from entrepreneurial 
effort discussed earlier and the availability of more attractive alternative occupa-
tions. Hence, if misperceptions of success probabilities drive entrepreneurship, why 
aren’t such initial misperceptions corrected by experience?
One parsimonious interpretation for both entry and persistence in entrepre-
neurship is the possibility that entrepreneurs receive nonpecuniary benefits from 
their self-employment. When authors like Hamilton (2000) and Moskowitz and 
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Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) point out the low average returns for entrepreneurship, 
as discussed earlier in this paper, they also advance the possibility that nonstan-
dard preferences for autonomy and control could be potential explanations for 
individuals’ inclination to become entrepreneurs as well as their persistence in 
entrepreneurship. Job characteristics that standard economic theories typically 
view as a means to obtaining higher pecuniary rewards—such as decision rights and 
control—may, for some people, be inherently valuable ends themselves.
People with such preferences may be lured to entrepreneurship by the promise 
of these job characteristics even though earnings may be lower. For instance, Frey, 
Benz, and Stutzer (2004) argue that independence and autonomy at work are 
sources of “procedural utility,” which raise happiness. In their discussion of small 
firms in the US economy, Hurst and Pugsley (2011) point out that most start 
small and remain small, with no new technology and no intention of growing. 
Many of them are small service firms: lawyers, skilled craftsmen, real estate agents, 
restaurateurs, and the like. Based on survey evidence from the Panel Study of 
Entrepreneurial Dynamics, a nationally representative sample of 34,000  individ-
uals during the fall of 2005 and the early winter of 2006, and the Kauffman Firm 
Survey, a panel study of 4,928 businesses that were newly founded in 2004, Hurst 
and Pugsley find that, for these firms, entrepreneurs claim nonpecuniary benefits 
as a first-order motive for self-employment.
However, the precise nature of these nonpecuniary benefits has remained 
largely unclear. For example, entrepreneurs work longer hours than the average 
employee. In only two of the 25  OECD countries (Russia and Chile) do the 
employed work longer hours than the self-employed, and the self-employed tend 
to work, on average, between 2 and 14 more hours (that is, 5–35 percent more) 
per week (Åstebro and Chen 2014). Thus, the nonpecuniary benefits do not simply 
reflect a preference for leisure. One possible source of nonpecuniary benefits is the 
autonomy and independence that an entrepreneur enjoys in allocating personal 
work time. More broadly, an entrepreneur can exercise control over the company 
and need not worry about interference by other parties. The importance of factors 
such as “control over one’s life” and a “sense of purpose” is documented in studies 
that are not focused on entrepreneurship but instead study hypothetical choices 
in relation to predicted subjective levels of happiness over varied contexts (for 
example, Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Rees-Jones 2012). Other nonpecuniary 
benefits from self-employment may arise from the pride in bringing one’s own 
business idea to market success or from a taste for variety. Addressing the latter 
case, Åstebro and Thompson (2011) surveyed 820  Canadian entrepreneurs who 
sought assistance at the Canadian Innovation Center at the University of Waterloo 
and compared their responses to those of a matched sample of 300  Canadian 
non-entrepreneurs. They find that those who have been entrepreneurs tend to be 
those whose reported behavior suggests a taste for variety, for instance they have 
varied labor market experience.
There have been attempts to infer the nonpecuniary benefits from 
self-employment; typically, this involves looking at the lower average returns 
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earned by entrepreneurs, adjusting for other factors, and then noting that the non-
pecuniary benefits must be large enough to offset this difference. Thus, as we note 
earlier, Hamilton (2000) estimates a median net present value lifetime earnings 
differential of 35 percent for individuals in business for ten years. Moskowitz and 
Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) find that nonpecuniary benefits of self-employment may 
be as large as 143 percent of total annual income. Åstebro and Thompson (2011) 
find the size of the nonpecuniary benefits of having a large variety of skills in entre-
preneurship is on the order of 16 to 22 percent of annual household income.
Obviously, it is almost impossible to infer the nature and magnitude of these 
nonpecuniary benefits directly from these data. Usually, these benefits are private, and 
the measured earnings differentials can only provide a crude approximation. Exper-
imental studies thus provide useful complementary evidence in this regard. While 
such studies are usually restricted to the study of non-entrepreneurial samples and 
the situations under consideration are rather artificial, they can advance our under-
standing of these nonpecuniary motives by demonstrating a preference for keeping 
control over decisions, shedding light on the motivations underlying this behavior 
and highlighting their potential importance for understanding entrepreneurship.
For example, Cooper and Saral (2013) ran experiments with 184 subjects—a 
mixture of undergraduates, business school students, entrepreneurs, and other busi-
ness people—who performed the task of answering questions from the Graduate 
Management Aptitude Test (GMAT). In the study, subjects decided whether to work 
alone or in groups. Entrepreneurs showed a greater willingness to pay for working 
independently, despite monetary incentives to the contrary. In a post-experimental 
questionnaire, many subjects who revealed a preference for working alone indi-
cated a fear of loss of control or a preference for self-reliance.
Other recent experiments look at the underlying motivations that lead 
individuals to cede or retain control. Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening (2013) study a 
structured interaction in which principals must decide whether to delegate deci-
sion rights to agents in a situation of incomplete information. Using a subject 
pool of 504 university students in Zurich, they conducted a laboratory experiment 
showing that individuals hold on to decision rights in situations in which rendering 
control would clearly be preferable for all involved parties in terms of expected 
monetary value. This behavior does not diminish with experience, and appears to 
be driven by regret aversion: if subjects delegate decision rights but discover later 
that they would have been better off keeping them, they display strong negative 
reactions. Owens, Grossman, and Fackler (forthcoming) provide further experi-
mental evidence for inefficient holding on to control. In their study, subjects 
must choose between an asset that will pay off if they answer a question correctly 
or an asset that will pay off if their partner answers a question correctly. Results 
over 108 students show that individuals are willing to sacrifice 8 to 15 percent of 
expected earnings in exchange for control over their payoff. Similar considerations 
regarding an inherent value of authority and control may drive an entrepreneur’s 
decision to remain in entrepreneurship even when doing so is unprofitable from 
a material perspective.
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Finally, Bartling, Fehr, and Herz (forthcoming) conducted an experiment that 
measures individuals’ intrinsic valuation of decision rights. Subjects participate in 
a game in which a principal or an agent can make decisions that have monetary 
consequences for both. Principals reveal indifference between their own decision 
and a specific decision by the agent, and these decisions define two lotteries. If 
decision rights carry no intrinsic value, the certainty equivalents of both lotteries 
must be the same. This is tested by again presenting the lotteries to the principals 
but simply as given lotteries over outcomes that are not the result of anyone’s deci-
sion. Differences in elicited certainty equivalents would therefore reflect the direct 
impact of decision rights on utility. In a group of 172  students at the University 
of Zurich, Bartling, Fehr, and Herz identify an average compensating differential 
of 16.7 percent for letting the agent decide. Hence, unlike with evidence from the 
field, where the inferred compensating differentials for entrepreneurship may 
include many components, in this experimental study, a precise value is given to 
one specific dimension: personal control over decision making.
Taken together, evidence from the field—specifically, the observed compen-
sating differentials and the complementary survey evidence—strongly suggest that 
nonpecuniary benefits may play an important role in the decision to become and 
remain an entrepreneur. Experimental evidence, which allows studying the deter-
minants of human behavior more directly, also highlights mechanisms that may 
underlie such nonpecuniary benefits of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs may be 
those who like to work independently and not rely on others, and control appears 
to be inherently valuable.
However, while the evidence above suggests an important role for nonpecu-
niary utility from entrepreneurial activity, our view of the literature is that a gap 
remains in identifying the importance of these considerations for explaining 
the entry and persistence puzzle. Much more needs to be understood about the 
importance and  precise nature of nonpecuniary factors for driving entrepre-
neurship. For example, the evidence by Hurst and Pugsley (2011) indicates that 
individuals primarily motivated by nonpecuniary factors do not necessarily sort into 
high-growth sectors and, instead, are satisfied by consuming desirable job character-
istics in low-growth sectors. This suggests that preferences for autonomy and control 
may not only drive the decision to become an entrepreneur but also the kinds of 
businesses that entrepreneurs pursue. The relevance of nonpecuniary benefits in 
explaining entrepreneurship in different sectors of the economy is, therefore, a 
promising possible interpretation but one for which more research is necessary.
New Frontiers in Behavioral Entrepreneurship
Clearly, behavioral interpretations of the drivers of entrepreneurship are poten-
tially valuable in accounting for the entry and persistence puzzle. However, none of 
the interpretations stands out as the primary factor, and there is little evidence on 
how much of the behavior of actual entrepreneurs is accounted for by any of the 
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mechanisms. There is plenty of circumstantial evidence for each of the possible 
explanations, but no “smoking gun.” Indeed, reviewing the evidence on the roots of 
entrepreneurship, what surprises us most is how little we really know.
In this regard, it is important that research continue to pursue an understanding 
of the role the above mechanisms, as well as others, play in entrepreneurship. 
Indeed, research on the behavioral roots of entrepreneurship is proceeding on 
many fronts. To conclude this article, we lay out three directions that seem espe-
cially promising and important.
First, much of the research on entry into entrepreneurship has tended to focus 
on single factors—such as risk preferences, overconfidence, or nonpecuniary bene-
fits. The time is ripe to compare and contrast these factors since the evidence is 
often consistent with multiple candidate explanations. For example, the data show 
that the relationship between personal wealth and entrepreneurship is flat for most 
of the wealth distribution but rises sharply above the 80th percentile of wealth and 
is steepest for the wealthiest 5 percent of the population (Hurst and Lusardi 2004). 
Such evidence is consistent with risk preferences as a driving factor for entry—risk 
aversion may be decreasing in wealth—but it is also consistent with entrepreneur-
ship being a luxury good that is consumed more by wealthier individuals. Of course, 
it is also consistent with the presence of financing constraints in entrepreneurship—
again, highlighting the necessary caution that must accompany any interpretation 
of this fact.
Research into the roots of entrepreneurship could also benefit from richer 
data that allows disentangling different interpretations. For example, to differen-
tiate preference-based explanations from overconfidence and optimism, valuable 
insights might be gained from a detailed panel study comparing entrepreneurs’ 
assessments of and motivations for becoming entrepreneurs both before they begin 
and afterwards. Do they regret their entry decision? Such surveys may suffer from 
after-the-fact justifications of own choices and from hindsight bias but can none-
theless shed further light on the relevance of the different factors in driving entry 
into entrepreneurship.
Progress on quantifying the relevance of the candidate explanations also 
requires reliable and precise measurements so that research can cumulatively build 
towards a consensus. Currently, the most precise measurements often take place in 
laboratory settings, implicitly assuming that more general measures of optimism, 
overconfidence, and preferences are stable and generalizable across contexts. Iden-
tification that is directly linked to entrepreneurial activity is likely to yield more 
insight into the mechanisms driving entry. Furthermore, just as many factors may 
account for the puzzle we outline, it also seems conceivable that different factors 
may account for various sub-segments of entrepreneurship. While small business 
owners may mainly be motivated by nonpecuniary benefits, entrepreneurship at 
the technological frontier may be better explained by overconfidence or risk pref-
erences. Understanding such heterogeneous motivations, where they apply, and 
how they may interact seems critically important for understanding entrepreneurial 
entry and persistence.
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Second, it is important to understand how individuals’ perceptions of entre-
preneurship are formed and shaped. Optimism, overplacement, and overestimation 
manifest themselves in exaggerated beliefs about the profitability of entrepreneurial 
activity. Such beliefs about the returns to entrepreneurship may be shaped by social 
context, including role models or peers. For example, there appears to be inter-
generational correlation in entrepreneurship and self-employment (Dunn and 
Holtz-Eakin 2000). Lindquist, Sol, and van Praag (forthcoming) show, using data 
from biological children and adoptees, that nonbiological factors as well as biolog-
ical factors indeed contribute to this association but that post-birth factors play a 
more important role. Using census data from Denmark, Nanda and Sørensen (2010) 
provide further evidence on the relevance of social factors, finding that individuals 
are more likely to become entrepreneurs if their coworkers have previously been 
entrepreneurs (see also Giannetti and Simonov 2009). Lerner and Malmendier 
(2013) also find that peers shape entry, but their evidence is that of reduced entry 
into entrepreneurship among MBA students whose peers had entrepreneurial expe-
rience. In addition, Lerner and Malmendier find that having entrepreneurial peers 
reduces the likelihood of starting firms that fail. This latter work suggests that it may 
be possible to reduce potential distortions in the expected distribution of the returns 
to entrepreneurship through exposure to those who have experienced it first-hand. 
Preference-based explanations may also have their root in an individual’s social 
environment. For instance, persistence in entrepreneurship may be influenced by 
different cultural perceptions of the stigma of failure.
Finally, the societal implications of “excessive entry” need to be better under-
stood. There is a widely held belief that some entrepreneurs generate substantial 
positive externalities, and excessive entry may be central to the process of creative 
destruction. For example, it has been estimated that probably well in excess of 
90  percent of the benefits of breakthrough innovation go to society as a whole 
rather than to the individual inventor, their partners, or their financial backers 
(Baumol 2002; Nordhaus 2004). In this sense, perhaps excessive entry is a blessing 
for society. Understanding whether excessive entry is in fact welfare enhancing due 
to these externalities is therefore important for guiding policy. Some initial steps 
in understanding the interplay of behavioral biases and welfare have been made 
by Bernardo and Welch (2001), who use an evolutionary model to show equilib-
rium persistence of overconfident entrepreneurs. They assume that overconfident 
entrepreneurs have too much confidence in their private information—that is, they 
suffer from overprecision—and are therefore less likely to imitate their peers. While 
such overconfidence is harmful to the overconfident entrepreneurs, Bernardo and 
Welch show that it can be welfare enhancing for society.
Whether excessive entry is indeed optimal from a societal perspective may criti-
cally depend on the actual drivers of entry and the sector in which excess entry takes 
place. For example, while overestimation and optimism may trigger the pursuit 
of breakthrough innovations with strong positive externalities, overplacement 
may primarily lead to entry into already contested markets, and it may be associ-
ated more with imitation. Hence, while overplacement may still indirectly foster 
Thomas Åstebro, Holger Herz, Ramana Nanda, and Roberto A. Weber     67
innovation through increased competition within a market, the potential positive 
externalities are much less clear.
Similarly, entrepreneurs with strong nonpecuniary motivations may mainly sort 
into low-growth, non-inventive small businesses. Consequently, policies subsidizing 
entrepreneurship must be examined to determine the extent to which they provide 
positive externalities for the economy as opposed to only providing consumption 
value to the entrepreneur. Policies that simply favor small businesses, which are 
common in the US and other countries, may not be optimal from a societal viewpoint 
(Hurst and Pugsley 2011). In particular, the potential prevalence of nonpecuniary 
benefits as the main driver into small-scale entrepreneurship may call for stricter 
targeting of policy to foster high-growth industries at the technological frontier.
A comprehensive account of entrepreneurial decision making is likely to 
include both behavioral and nonbehavioral elements. In our view, behavioral 
research has not yet provided definitive explanations for puzzling aspects of entre-
preneurship. Rather, the real promise of behavioral research lies in the potential 
for future insights that integrate and enlighten our understanding of this important 
dimension of economic activity.
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